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Based on an extensive sample of U.S. closed-end funds undergoing open-ending conversion, we 
examine the behavior of discounts prior to the announcement till the date of open-ending. Discounts 
are significantly reduced upon announcement of open-ending with price increase. Announcement 
period return is directly related to the pre-announcement discount, liquidity, and other characteristics 
of the fund. We decompose the pre-announcement discount into structural and diosyncratic parts, 
and report that there is a greater reduction of the idiosyncratcic part of the discount. We examine the 
role of distributions to the investors on the size and behavior of discounts subsequent to the open-
ending announcement. We find that small amounts of discounts remain at the time of the open-
ending and investigate potential explanations for such discounts. 
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 The behavior of discounts of closed-end funds undergoing open-ending  
 
1. Introduction 
We examine the pricing behavior and the discount of U.S. closed-end funds that undergo 
open-ending. Our study of discounts in the context of open-ending provides insight in to the nature of 
observed discounts on closed-end funds in general.
1 Earlier studies report that open-ending of 
closed-end funds eliminates the discount, and thus generates an increase in value which is captured 
by shareholders. The greater prevalence of open-ending in recent years necessitates a 
reexamination of the issue of open-ending. We employ a larger sample spanning a longer time-
period and obtain new insights into many aspects of the closed-end discount puzzle. 
The persistence of closed-end fund discounts and its disappearance at the time of fund 
termination is a puzzle as Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1990) note. A possible explanation for closed-
end funds discounts is the miscalculation of net asset value due to tax liabilities and unrealized 
capital gains or illiquidity of the assets held in the fund.
2 Malkiel (1977) provides evidence that the 
discount is related to the amount of restricted stock in the portfolio - lending credence to the view 
that asset illiquidity is a primary reason for fund discount. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1990), however, 
note that ‘when funds are open-ended the price rises to net asset value’ and they argue that asset 
illiquidity as an insufficient explanation for the observed discount. 
We decompose the closed-end fund discounts into two components - a systematic and an 
idiosyncratic component. The systematic component is the predictable part of discount based on the 
type of the fund, its trading pattern, liquidity, risk, age since inception, and similar variables. The 
idisyncratic part of discount is the difference between the observed discount and the predictable 
                                                 
1  The term “open-ending” refers to any of the events that terminate a closed-end fund: liquidation of the 
fund, conversion to an open-end fund, or merger with an open-ended fund. 
 
2  Other economic explanations include agency costs and managerial performance (Boudreaux, 1973; 
Deaves and Krinsky, 1994; Gemmill and Thomas, 2002); and market segmentation (Bonser-Neal, 
Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley, 1990; Chang, Eun and Kolodny, 1995; Bekaert and Urias, 1996). These 
explanations are unable to account for all the anomalies related to the pricing of closed-end funds. The 
inability to explain the persistence of discounts within a rational framework has lead to behavioral 
explanations (Zweig, 1973; De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1990; Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 
1991; Gemmill and Thomas, 2002; Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999). component of discount. The abnormal return response at the time of the announcement is related to 
the size of the discount – the larger the pre-announcement discount the higher the announcement 
period abnormal returns. Additionally, we present evidence that at the time of the announcement, the 
abnormal return responds to close the idiosyncratic discount rapidly. However, only a smaller part of 
the sytematic discount is eliminated at that time. The remaining part of the systematic discount is 
subsequently eliminated or reduced by the date of open-ending. 
We employ a large sample of 113 open-ending events during the 1973 – 2005 period, with 
particular focus on open-ending announcements made in recent years - 92 events in the post-1990 
period. We document average abnormal return of 6.6% to the announcement of the open-ending. 
The average discount of the closed-end funds in the sample reduces from 11.25% prior to the open-
ending announcement to 6.22% following the announcement. Cross-sectional analysis shows that 
the abnormal returns are directly related to the pre-announcement discount, although these 
discounts are not completely eliminated subsequent to the announcement. We examine the nature 
and determinants of the post-announcement discount and the discount observed just prior to the 
open-ending. 
Brickley and Schallheim (1985) speculate that the reaction to open-ending announcements 
of closed-end funds is likely to be stronger in subsequent years, as the market learns from the early 
cases of open-endings. Contrary to this prediction, we find that the discount reduces by an additional 
3.81% in the period between announcement and the actual conversion to open-ending. The 
reorganization activity from the announcement date to the actual open-ending date results in an 
overall reduction in discount of 7.61%. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: a brief discussion of previous studies with 
emphasis on the relationship between the discounts and open-ending is discussed in the next 
section, and descriptive statistics for the sample is given in section 3.  Sections 4 and 5 present the 
results with concluding remarks in section 6. 
  22. Open-ending of closed-end funds 
 
2.1. The open-ending process 
In a typical open-ending, the board of directors requests an open-ending proposal from the 
management. Once the board approves the restructuring proposal, shareholders vote is sought. The 
terms and conditions of open-endings by closed-end funds are declared via press releases and 
become public. Usually this occurs in a period five to seven months before the open-ending occurs. 
Alternative to the management inititated proposal, the fund may announce that according to 
the fund's prospectus a shareholder vote on open-ending is triggered in the event that a sufficiently 
large discount exists for a specified time period. An example is provided in the following statement 
contained in the announcement by the Dessauer Global Equity Fund: 
“…The Fund’s prospectus provides that after 18 months from the date of the fund’s initial public 
offering, the fund will automatically convert to an open-end investment company if its shares close at 
a market price that is at a 5% or greater discount to the net asset value of the fund on the last 
business day of any week and for each of the next 14 business days.” (LexisNexis Archives, Open-
ending Announcement, January 6, 1999). 
There are certain drawbacks in reorganizing the closed-end fund into an open-ended entity. 
The legal structure of closed-end funds provides a stable asset base. This enables the manager of 
the closed-end fund to make longer-term investment decisions based on the fund’s investment 
strategy without being unduly affected by the shareholders’ buying or selling sentiments or activities, 
or being overly concerned about potential redemption considerations. Conversely, open-end funds 
tend to have a fluctuating asset base due to purchase and redemption requests by shareholders. 
Therefore, investor sentiment might affect the portfolio structure rather than the investment 
philosophy of the fund. Another disadvantage of converting into an open-end fund is that closed-end 
funds can add leverage to their portfolio whereas open-end funds do not have such opportunities. 
  3Furthermore, closed-end funds are better able to direct more investments into illiquid securities 
compared to open-ended mutuals.
3
 
2.2. Empirical evidence on open-ending 
Malkiel (1977) suggests that closed-end funds may carry illiquid assets on their books at 
higher than their realizable value. This explanation implies that on open-ending, the NAV should 
decrease. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) state that the available evidence reveals the opposite: on 
liquidation, prices rise to the NAV, as shown in the studies discussed below. 
Brauer (1984), and Brickley and Schallheim (1985) provide evidence that positive abnormal 
returns generated by reorganizing closed-end funds allow shareholders to obtain the market value of 
the fund’s assets. Their evidence rests on relatively small samples - 14 funds in the Brauer study, 
and 10 funds in the Brickley and Schallheim study. Brauer documents an abnormal return of 9.3% 
during the announcement month and the following month, although most of the positive abnormal 
return associated with open-ending is incorporated into the market price by the end of the 
announcement month. Such timely market response is consistent with a market for closed-end funds 
that is generally efficient. Dimson and Minio-Paluello (2002) state that Draper (1989) reports similar 
results for U.K. based closed-end funds. 
Brauer (1988) examines the valuation effects of the potential for open-ending. He states that 
a trading strategy governed by the size of the discount and the management expense ratio can be 
profitable if it can identify likely candidates for open-ending. Thus closed-end funds’ discounts may 
contain information that can be used in a predictive model to capture open-ending activity. Brickley 
and Schallheim (1985) report an average abnormal return of 15.3% by investing on the last day of 
the month in which the announcement is made and holding until the fund is reorganized. 
Deaves and Krinsky (1994) investigate the relationship between discounts and managerial 
performance. Specifically, they argue that investors may attach an increased probability to open-
                                                 
3  Deli and Varma (2002) examine the choice of organizational form for investment funds and report that 
closed-end funds tend to hold less liquid securities and their security prices are less transparent than 
that of open-ended funds. 
  4ending for funds with poor managerial performance causing the price to move toward the NAV. 
Thus, the discount may narrow as managerial performance declines. 
The role of block ownership and governance in the open-ending decision is examined by 
Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) who show a relationship between discounts and the 
concentration of stock ownership. As the fraction of stock owned by management increases, the 
discount to net asset value becomes larger. They argue that blockholders’ resistance to the open-
ending decision may be largely driven by the private benefits that accrue to them. 
Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003) find evidence that board independence and structure 
are associated with the effectiveness of the board representing shareholders interests. Using 
discounts and expense ratios as measures of board effectiveness, they report that more 
independent boards are more likely to restructure the fund in the face of large discounts from net 
asset value. However, contrary to the evidence presented in Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993), 
they do not find a relation between blockholdings and fund discounts and blockholdings and the 




3.1. Sample  
We used the investment company funds listed on the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) files, and scrutinized delisting codes for closed-end funds.
4 There were 307 closed-end 
funds which were delisted between the period 1973 and 2005. We read all press releases 
associated with these incidences in Lexis-Nexis, Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal Indexes. We 
obtained an initial sample of 114 conversions to open-ending announcements for closed-end funds. 
The final sample consists of 113 cases after dropping one contaminated case.
5
                                                 
4  We examined nine different delisting codes under the mergers category, two delisting codes under the 
exchanges category, four delisting codes under the liquidations category, and ten delisting codes under 
the dropped category. 
 
5  The board of director of one fund (Alliance New Europe Fund) approved a program of open-market 
repurchase for the fund’s common stocks a week surrounding the open-ending announcement date. 
  5We present the time distribution of the announcements and types of the funds in Panel A of 
Table 1. We have only fourteen cases between 1973 and 1985. Open ending activity appears to pick 
up pace during the 1990s with approximately 1/3
rd of the cases observed in the 1996 to 2000 period. 
Fifty-three funds in the sample converted to an open-end investment company, thirty-three of the 
funds merged into exisitng open-end funds, and the remaining twenty-seven cases ceased to be 
closed-end funds through either liquidation or acquisition by other open-end funds. 
The Wall Street Journal in its weekly closed-end fund price quotation column classifies the 
funds into several categories. We present a summary of the fund types in Panel B based on the Wall 
Street Journal classification. Broadly categorized, there are sixty-nine equity funds consisting of 
forty-three international equity funds and twenty-six domestic equity funds. There are forty-four bond 
funds out of which thirty-six are domestic bond funds and eight are world bond funds. Thus, there 
are fifty-one international or global funds and sixty-two domestic funds in the sample. 
Among the bond funds, we have many different types of funds including mortgage funds, 
muni bond funds, high yield bond funds, government bond funds, etc. Similarly, among the equity 
funds there are country funds, world industry funds, international and global funds, dual-purpose 
funds, equity and convertible funds, etc. These funds invest in different asset classes which may 
exhibit time varying degrees of marketability, liquidity, and investor interest over the sampling period. 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
We provide summaries of size and price related variables in Table 2. The average (median) 
market value of the funds is $140.99 million ($75.30 million) on the announcement date. The 
average number of shares outstanding is 14.13 million (median of 6.52 million). Share prices range 
from $0.79 to $144.80 with a mean of $13.06 (median of $10.00). The average net asset value on 
the announcement date is $14.26 with a median of $11.10.
6 The average number of trading days 
                                                 
6  The use of low priced funds in the sample has no effect on our results and conclusions. There are three 
funds with price below $1.00 and three funds with price below $3.50. All other funds in the sample are 
priced above $5.00. The event study and the cross-sectional results, reported subsequently, are robust 
with regard to the inclusion or exclusion of these three funds. 
  6between announcement and open-ending is 171.49 days (median of 151 days). The average age of 
the funds is 11.38 years (median of 9 years) at the open ending date. 
We split the sample six-ways into equity, dual and bond funds, and into domestic and 
international funds. We show the pre-announcement discounts corresponding to the sub-samples in 
Table 3. Domestic equity funds’ discount averages 14.23% and it is higher than both domestic dual 
funds (8.03%) and domestic bond funds (8.94%). Foreign equity funds exhibit an average discount 
of 12.92%. Equity funds, both domestic and foreign, trade at a greater discount than do dual funds or 




4.1 Measurement of abnormal returns 
We employ the standard event study approach. We use the open-ending announcement as 
day 0, and estimate the market model with equally-weighted returns for the period, –250 to –31 in 
event time. We obtain daily abnormal return as the difference between the actual returns and the 
expected returns.









= ∑  
where n is the sample size, and ARi,t is the abnormal return of the i
th closed-end fund at time t. We 
compute  t SAR  as the average standardized abnormal return on day t. We compute the significance 
of the abnormal returns using a z–statistic,  t z nS A R = . The cumulative average return over a period 
                                                 
7  Our results are robust when we employ the CRSP value weighted index. To the extent that the share of 
a closed-end fund responds to the broad market movement, irrespective of the nature of the fund 
portfolio, our use of the CRSP index is reasonable. However, there is a possibility of an omitted index in 
the context of international funds and bonds funds by only using the CRSP index. 
 
  7is obtained by summing the AAR. The percentage of observations with positive returns is also 
computed for robustness. We also report a binomial z-statistic.
8
 
4.2 Abnormal returns results 
We present the abnormal portfolio returns for the sample of 113 open-endings in Table 4. 
The announcement day average abnormal return is 3.80% with a highly significant z-statistic of 
37.60. Abnormal return ranges from a low of –3.58% to a high of 21.66%. Eighty-five funds (75%) 
exhibit positive abnormal returns with a highly significant binomial z-statistic of 5.36. For the day 
following the announcement date, we find an average abnormal return of 2.82% with a significant z-
statistic of 21.89.  Since the actual time of the announcement is not known with accuracy, days 0 
and day 1 together constitute the announcement period. The announcement period abnormal return 
is 6.63% with a significant z-statistic of 42.07 whereas the 10-day pre- and post-periods do not show 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns. 
The abnormal return observed during the announcement period is consistent with the market 
expectation that eventual open-ending will help eliminate the discount. Since the actual open-ending 
date is far in the future, and there may be some uncertainty attached to the actual open-ending, all 
the discount is not immediately eliminated upon the announcement. 
We present the announcement period abnormal returns by fund types in Table 5. Domestic 
equity funds return of 8.83% is higher than the foreign equity funds return of 7.20%. Domestic dual 
funds return of 3.91% is lower than the foreign dual fund return of 4.60%. Equity funds respond to 
the reorganization announcement is 7.66% on average and is higher than both dual funds’ and bond 
funds’ abnormal returns which are 5.46% and 5.63%, respectively. We can summarize results  thus: 
equity funds have higher abnormal return than bond funds and dual funds; and domestic funds 
exhibit lower abnormal return than international funds. These results lend support to the asset 
liquidity argument presented earlier, with bond funds and international funds perhaps being less 
liquid than domestic equity funds. 
                                                 
8  The binomial z-statistic is: () [ ( 1 ) ] z PPOS p p p N =− ⋅ − / , where  is the percentage of positive 
observations, 
PPOS
p is the expected percentage positive (50%) under the null, and  N is the sample size. 
  85. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
5.1. Variables 
We examine the cross-sectional variation in the information content revealed by the 
announcement of the reorganization. The selection of some of the variables is motivated by previous 
research on closed-end funds open market stock repurchases. A fund trading at a discount from the 
NAV is expected to go up by a like amount. Consider a fund trading at a price of $8.00 and NAV of 
$10.00, with a discount of 20% from the NAV. After the announcement, assume that the stock goes 
up to the NAV of $10.00, then the investor would realize a return of 25% ($10.00 / $8.00 - 1). The 
abnormal return is likely to be related to the 25% return computed above.  
The observed pre-announcement discount of the fund is composed of a structural part and 
an idisyncratic part:OD SD ID = + , where OD is the observed pre-announcement disocunt, SD is 
the structural component of the discount and ID is the idiosyncratic part of the discount. The 
structural component of the discount depends on a number of variables described, and it is 
estimated from a regression equation. The idiosyncratic part of the discount is the residual. We first 






OD X ID ββ
=
=+ ⋅ + ∑ i  
where; the subscript i refers to the individual funds and the Xk refers to the characterestics such 
as turnover of fund shares, size of fund, volatility of discount, type of fund, exchange traded, age of 
fund, unrealized loss, portfolio turnover, time period of transaction. These variables have been used 
in the literature as explanatory variables in discount estimation. The IDi is estimated as a residual 
from the estimated equation by fund. Next, we employ the estimates of ODi and IDi in our estimation 
of the abnormal return equation. Specifically, we employ the following general equation in four 
specifications and report the results in Panel A of Table 6. 
OD = β0 + β1Turnover + β2Size + β3Volatility of Discountize + β4Equity Fund + β5Foreign Fund + 
β6Equity*Foreign + β7NYSE + β8Unrealized Loss + β9Fund Age + β10Portfolio Turnover 
+ β11Net Realized Loss + β11Pre-1998 + β12Early + β13Late      
 
  9The trading volume of the shares of a fund may be related to the discount. For funds with 
shares subject to low trading volume, there may be an illiquidity premium implicit in the price. 
Investors may bid up the price of these fund shares upon announcement since open-ending 
provides a less expensive exit strategy than encountering illiquid price in the market. We expect 
trading Turnover to be negatively related to the observed discount. We measure the market trading 
activity or Turnover of a fund as the ratio of daily volume divided by number of outstanding shares 
averaged over the estimation period.  
We examine the size of the fund, because it may proxy for informational asymmetry and 
response to information. The size of the fund is measured as the average of the market value of 
equity over -10, -5 before the announcement. Fund Size is the log of the average market value of 
equity. Larger funds are expected to have lower discounts.  
We expect that if a fund exhibits a relatively high level of variation in discount over time, such 
variations may be due to relative uncertainty in the valuation of assets. That is, a high degree of 
discount variation may suggest a high degree of illiquid assets in the closed-end fund’s portfolio. We 
expect a negative relationship between discounts and discount volatility. The type of funds is 
indicative of the quality of assets and the relative ease of valuation of these assets. It is expcted that 
equity assets may be more difficult to value and foreign equity even more difficult to value. Disocunts 
are expected to be higher for equity funds and for foerign funds. 
We include a variable ‘Early’ to capture the potential for time varying abnormal returns, as 
might arise by the changing nature of the market and the participants. We split the sample by the 
announcement date, which cases prior to 12/31/1996 taking a value of Early equal to 1 (53 cases), 
and the 76 post-December 1996 cases being assigned a value of 0. If the market exhibits learning, 
then the coefficient for Early should be negative. We also introduce unrealized loss, net realized 
loss, portfolio turnover, and fund age as variables that capture the staleness of prices and the tax 
consequences of trading transactions. 
Based on OD , we estimate the Structural Discount and the Idiosyncratic 
Discount part by funds. We define a variable Expected Return as OD
SD ID =+
i /(1 – ODi). If there is a 
discount of 20%, the abnormal return is likely to go up by 25% = 20% / (1-20%). We define a 
  10variable Return Surprise as IDi /(1 – IDi) similarly. We expect in the following regression that the 
coeeficient attached to Return Surprise should be greater than the coefficient attached to Expected 
Return, with both being positive. The abnormal return is likely to be influenced by size of the fund, by 
illiquidity (positive) and time to completion. We hypothesize that the idiosyncratic discount can be 
reduced more easily by the announcment information event whereas the structural component is 
reduced by the actual act of open-ending. 
01 2 i kk AR Expected Return Return Surprise V γδ δ λ =+⋅ +⋅ + ⋅ ∑  
where, the variables with the k subscripts refer to other control variables. Our primary interest is in 
the sign and relative magnitudes of the δ variables, i.e., δ2 > δ1.> 0. 
We employ a variety of control variables, including Size, an alternative measure of the 
illiquidity of the fund shares by employing an ILLIQ measure developed by Amihud (2002). We 
include the Time to Completion and Time dummies in the AR equation. The results are presented in 
Panel B of Table 6. 
We summarize the hypotheses of interest in Panel C. In each of the specifications, we find 
that the abnormal return is positively related to the SD and the ID parts. Both coefficeints δ1.> 0, and 
δ2 > 0. Of greater interest, we find that δ2 > δ1. Discussion of results to follow. 
 
5.3. Changes in discount following open-ending announcement  
A substantial reduction in the discount occurs at the time of announcement. Following the 
reorganization announcement, the gap between the net asset value and the share price narrows 
even further. Table 7 describes the behavior of the discounts more explicitly. Descriptive statistics at 
three points of time prior to announcement and for the average discount prior to open-ending 
announcement are provided in Panel A. 
Panel B shows that the average discount just before the reorganization announcement is 
11.25% (median of 10.12%). Following the announcement, it shrinks to 6.22% with a median of 
6.15%. The last observable discount has an average of 2.29% (median of 2.30%).  
  11The percent change values in NAV and in Price from post-announcement to the open-ending 
are presented in Panel C along with the change in discount for the same period. Accordingly the 
discount shrinks on average by 4.29% from the week following the reorganization announcement to 
the open-ending. Average NAVs for the same period drops by 0.80% whereas the market prices 
increase by 5.63%.  
The reorganization decisions of the sample firms are all management-sponsored proposal 
with the exception of two funds (Templeton Value Fund and Dessauer Global Equity Fund) where 
the conversion to open-ending is required by the prospectus of the fund if the average discount from 
NAV stays at a certain level for a specified time period. An important point to note is that a 
substantial drop occurs in the discount in the week following the announcement without any 
exception. Consistent with Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), discounts continue to shrink even further 
until the fund cease to exist. 
In order to achieve a better understanding of the discount reduction, we decompose the 
discount values before open-ending into the ratio of the difference between distribution amount and 
market price to the NAV and the ratio of the difference between NAV and distribution amount to the 
NAV. Summary statistics are presented in Table 8.
9 Significant positive values in Panel B indicate 
that the distribution amounts exceed the market price for both domestic and foreign equity funds. 
These results suggest the existence of transaction costs since the funds are distributing more than 
their market prices. On the other hand, negative values for equity funds presented in Panel B signal 
that NAVs are smaller than the distribution amount suggesting market inefficiency. Again, these 
results are consistent with the illiquidity hypothesis of equity funds and international funds.  
We do a regression analysis of the post announcement discounts and present the results in 
Table 9. The model specifications are similar to models relating abnormal returns except that we 
omit the Expected Return variable. The discounts are negatively related to the turnover, and not 
significantly related to the other variables. Thus, the less liquid funds are left with a higher level of 
                                                 
9 We dropped 25 cases where (NAV – Distribution amount)/NAV exceeds 0.25 (6 observations) or the 
distribution amount was not available on CRSP (19 observations). 
  12post-announcement discount. Conversely, more liquid funds have lower post-announcement 




The closed-end fund discount has attracted considerable attention from practitioners and 
academic researchers. The discount seems to suggest inefficient financial markets.  Recently, 
researchers have sought to provide explanations relying on behavioral theory based notions such as 
investor sentiment index. The behavior of the closed-end prices during the open-ending process is a 
critical part of the closed-end fund discount puzzle.   
Existing evidence on open-ending of closed-end funds relies on two early studies with very 
small sample sizes. Using a sample of 113 U.S. closed-end funds open-ending announcements 
between 1973 and 2005, this study documents a significant average abnormal return of 6.6 % during 
the announcement period. The average discounts of the closed-end funds in the sample is reduced 
from a discount of 11.25% prior to the announcement to a discount of 6.22% following the 
reorganization announcement. 
Cross-sectional analysis reveals that the announcement return is positively related to the 
size of the discount. Further, announcement returns are larger for more recent open-endings. 
However, the announcement reaction is not related to the volatility of the discount.  
After the announcement, there remains a discount of 6.22%. Cross-sectional analysis 
reveals that this discount is larger for illiquid funds. Also, the volatility is negatively related to the 
post-announcement discount. If the volatility is inversely related to the reliability of the fund’s NAV, 
then the smaller reaction could be due to greater uncertainty about the liquidation value of the fund. 
The average discount gradually decreases after the announcement reaching 2.30% just prior 
to the actual reorganization. This evidence raises several issues. First, is the gradual decline an 
indicator of market inefficiency. While this question has been addressed by the early studies, it is 
worthwhile to reexamine the issue using a larger sample. A related question is whether the decline in 
the discount is due to the market price gradually increasing or whether the fund management 
reduces NAV over time as they realize that some of the assets have smaller liquidation values than 
  13they had anticipated. Finally, the discount of 2.30% in the week prior to the reorganization deserves 
closer scrutiny. It might be attributable to either NAV errors or delays in shareholders receiving the 
liquidating distribution. Further research should address the value of the actual distribution to the 
closed-end fund investors to verify whether this final discount represents errors in the reported NAVs 
or whether there are other costs such as redemption fees tacked on to the closed-end fund shares 
that may provide an explanation of the discount.  
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 Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 113 open-ending of exchange-listed closed-end funds from 1973 to 2005. 
The time distribution of the sample is shown in Panel A. Panel B indicates the number of funds 




1973 – 1980  7 
1981 – 1985  7 
1986 – 1990  7 
1991 – 1995  14 
1996 – 2000  42 




Bond Funds:  44 
Domestic Bond Funds Total  36 
     Investment Grade Bond Funds  7 
     US Mortgage Bond Funds  6 
     Single State Muni Bond Funds  5 
     National Muni Bond Funds  5 
     Other Domestic Bond Funds  4 
     US Government Bond Funds  3 
     High Yield Bond Funds  3 
     Bond Funds  3 
World Bond Funds  8 
  
Equity Funds:  69 
World Equity Funds Total  43 
      Regional / Global Funds  17 
      Country Funds  16 
      World Industry Funds  8 
      Diversified  2 
Domestic Equity Funds Total  26 
      Equity and Convertible Funds  8 
      Dual-Purpose Funds  7 
      Diversified  6 
      General Equity Funds  5 
Total  113 
 
 Table 2: Fund shares trading statistics 
Summary statistics regarding the size, price, and NAV of the 113 close-ended funds that made 
open-ending announcement between 1973 - 2005 are shown in Panel A below. The values in Panel 
A are computed over the time period -10, -5 relative to the announcement date. Trading statistics for 
the funds are computed over the estimation period, days -250 to -21 relative to the announcement 
period.  Illiquidity ratio is a measure of the trading illiquidity in the CEF shares and is computed as in 
Amihud (2002).  The number of trading days between announcement and open-ending, and the age 
of the fund are reported in Panel C. 
 
  Mean Median  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Panel A:  Price and NAV  
Market value of equity ($ million)  139.0 70.0 176.8 7.0  1,172.2
Shares outstanding (millions)  14.1 6.5 18.5 0.8  126.5
Price per share ($)  12.9 9.9 14.7 0.8  146.2
Net asset value ($)  14.3 11.1 16.1 0.9 161.5
          
Panel B: Trading statistics   
Average trading volume as % of  
shares outstanding  0.21 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.52
Illiquidity Ratio   0.31 0.17 0.45 0. 00  2.48
   
Panel C:  Time  
Number of trading days between 
announcement and open-ending  117.9 106.0 63.4 3.0 320.0
Age of the fund (years)  11.4 9.0 10.5 1.0 55.0
 
 Table 3: Summary fund financial data 
Summary financial statistics pertaining to the closed end funds are presented below.  Data is 
collected from the financial reports closest to the announcement date. 
 
Unrealized Appreciation as a % of Total Assets
 n  mean  median  std  dev 
Non-Equity 50  -18.00% 2.17% 85.31% 
Equity 54  6.96%  9.64%  30.69% 
Total 104  -5.04%  2.79%  64.06% 
        
Net Realized Gain as a % of Total Assets
Non-Equity 48 -3.92%  0.19% 16.12% 
Equity 53  3.87%  2.18%  12.66% 
Total 101  0.16%  0.35%  14.86% 
        
Net Change in Unrealized Appreciation as % of Total Assets
Non-Equity 47 4.82%  1.83% 11.59% 
Equity 54  -2.54%  3.16%  26.77% 
Total 101  0.89%  1.90%  21.34% 
        
Expense Ratio 
Non-Equity 53 1.21%  1.05%  0.54% 
Equity 53  1.68%  1.59%  0.75% 
Total 106  1.45%  1.26%  0.69% 
        
Portfolio Turnover Ratio
Non-Equity 53 88.4%  46%  128.3% 
Equity 53  44.3% 29%  40.6% 
Total 106  66.4% 37%  97.2% 
 Table 4: Abnormal returns  
This table presents the event study results relative to the open-ending announcement day for a sample 
of 113 closed-ended funds that announced open-ending during the 1973 to 2005 period.  The market 
model with equally-weighted market return is estimated over the period –250 to –21.  Panel A presents 
the abnormal portfolio return, z-statistics, percentage of positive and negative observations, and 
binomial  z-statistics for positive abnormal returns.  Panel B shows the summary CAAR and the 








-10   0.020   -0.02    46:54 -0.94 
-9   0.028   -0.06    48:52 -0.38 
-8   0.101    1.01    49:51 -0.28 
-7  -0.040   -1.03    47:53 -0.57 
-6   0.186    1.33    50:50   0.09 
-5  -0.045   -0.58    41:59 -1.98** 
-4  -0.232   -1.24    36:64 -2.94*** 
-3   0.170    1.67*    50:50   0.00 
-2  -0.273   -1.78*    37:63 -2.73*** 
-1   0.048    0.56    52:48   0.38 
         
0   3.807  37.58***    75:25   5.36*** 
1   2.818  22.28***    65:35   3.10*** 
         
2  -0.067   -0.53    44:56 -1.22 
3  -0.017    0.02    45:55 -1.14 
4   0.003   -0.53    48:52 -0.38 
5   0.092    0.60    49:51 -0.19 
6  -0.012   -0.40    44:56 -1.23 
7   0.133    0.53    48:52 -0.48 
8  -0.105   -0.32    46:54 -0.77 
9  -0.019   -0.60    48:52 -0.38 




Period  Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (%)  z-statistic 
(-10, -1)  -0.037     -0.04 
(0, 1)  6.625    42.33*** 
(2, 10)  -0.004     -0.43 
  
Table 5: Discounts and abnormal returns by fund type 
The table shows the pre-announcement discounts and the two-day announcement period abnormal 
returns summarized by the type of fund for the 113 closed-ended funds that announced open-ending 
during the 1973 to 2005 period.  Discounts are computed as: (Market Price – NAV) / NAV.  A negative 
discount implies a premium. The discounts and the corresponding t-statistics are shown in Panel A. 
The two-day announcement period abnormal return and the corresponding z-statistic are presented in 
Panel B. ***, **, * respectively denote significance at better than 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
  Panel A: Pre-announcement discount Panel B: Abnormal return  
  cases Discount  (%) t-statistic  AAR (%) z-statistic    
Domestic Funds:    
Equity Funds  16  14.23 7.25 *** 8.81 16.18 *** 
Dual Funds  11  8.03 4.36 *** 3.93 8.84 *** 
Bond Funds  37  8.94 17.72 *** 5.64 30.54 *** 
Total   64  10.1 14.33 *** 6.14 34.97 *** 
      
Foreign Funds:      
Equity Funds  41  12.92 12.46 *** 7.20 21.05 *** 
Dual Funds  8  11.86 4.55 *** 7.57 12.53 *** 
Bond Funds  0    
Total   49  12.74 13.33 *** 7.26 24.32 *** 
      
All funds:      
Equity Funds  57  13.29 14.43 *** 7.65 26.43 *** 
Dual Funds  19  9.63 6.22 *** 5.46 14.85 *** 
Bond Funds  37  8.94 17.72 *** 5.64 30.54 *** 
Total   113  11.25 19.19 *** 6.63 42.33 *** 
 Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of pre-announcement discounts and announcement period abnormal returns 
Pre-announcement discount is the dependent variable in Panel A. From the regression structural discount (SD) and residual discount (ID) are 
decomposed and used to estimate Expected Return [ED / (1-ED)], and Return Surprise [ID / (1-ID)] employed in Panel B. The dependent variable 
in Panel B is the announcement period abnormal return. Estimated difference of coefficient between Return Surprise and Expected Return is 
shown in Panel C. Significance of the t-statistics of the estimates are indicated by 
***, 
**, and 
* at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
         PANEL A: Discount Equation  coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
Turnover of Fund Shares in Market  0.019 3.08***         0.018 2.71*** 0.022 4.05*** 0.022 3.18***
Market Capitalization of Fund (log)  -0.016 -2.45**            -0.016 -2.32** -0.024 -3.70*** -0.016 -2.47**
Volatility of Discount  -0.738 -3.15***   -0.729 -3.34***      -0.667 -2.76*** -0.773 -3.23***
Equity Fund (Dummy)  0.074 3.73***   0.059 2.87***      0.037 1.88*  0.071 3.58***
Foreign Fund (Dummy)  0.025 0.91     0.043 1.65     0.067 2.32**    0.022 0.81  
Equity  *  Foreign  -0.082 -2.50**            -0.081 -2.60** -0.098 -2.91*** -0.076 -2.35**
NYSE (Dummy)  0.026 2.03**    0.025 1.95*          0.037 2.50** 0.026 1.93*
Unrealized Loss (Dummy)  _._     0.005 0.52     _._     _._  
Fund Age Since Inception (log)  _._     0.009 1.27     _._     _._  
High Portfolio Turnover (Dummy)  _._     _._     -0.022 -2.01**    _._  
Net Realized Loss (Dummy)  _._     _._     0.051 1.34     _._  
Pre 1998 Period (Dummy)  -0.012 -1.08     -0.008 -0.73     -0.006 -0.43     _._  
Period: 1997 to 2000 (Dummy)  _._     _._     _._     -0.004 -0.30  
Period: 2000 to 2005 (Dummy)  _._     _._     _._     0.007 0.54  
Constant 0.241 3.46***   2.72 0.224 ***      0.335 4.68*** 0.239 3.16***
F-statistic           7.51***  5.94***  7.24***  6.13***
R-squared                        32.8% 33.5% 41.5% 32.7%
PANEL B: Abnormal Return                     
Expected Return  0.290 3.04***   0.311 3.01***   0.311 2.83***  0.357 3.58***
Return  Surprise          0.640 6.38*** 0.658 6.14*** 0.639 5.35*** 0.638 6.96***
Market Capitalization of Fund (log)  0.003 0.51            0.006 1.27    0.002 0.32  0.003 0.56
Trading Illiquidity (Dummy)  0.029 2.73***           0.028 2.59** 0.034 2.74*** 0.023 2.24**
Time to Completion (log of days)  0.011 1.43        0.007 0.94    0.009 1.21    0.011 1.51   
NYSE (Dummy)  0.008 0.59     0.011 0.91     0.007 0.55     0.005 0.42  
Pre 1998 Period (Dummy)  -0.017 -1.88*    -0.023 -2.82***    -0.010 -0.93     _._    
Period: 1997 to 2000 (Dummy)  _._     _._     _._     -0.002 -0.23  
Period: 2000 to 2005 (Dummy)  _._     _._     _._     0.025 2.45** 
Constant  0.067 -1.00            -0.095 -1.49    -0.057 -0.72  -0.091 -1.30
F-statistic             11.09*** 11.01***  8.09*** 11.25***
R-squared             48.3%  50.9%   45.7%   51.3%  
PANEL C: Response Differential                        
Return Surprise less Expected Return  0.350 3.72***         0.347 3.34*** 0.328 2.77*** 0.281 3.33***
Observations  113          103    95    113  
  
Table 7: Behavior of discounts over time 
Summary statistics for 113 closed-end funds that made open-ending announcement during the 1973 to 
2005 period is reported below.  Discounts are computed as: (Market Price – NAV) / NAV.  A negative 
discount implies a premium. The discounts for twelve prior months are shown in Panel A, and discounts 
for the weeks surrounding the announcement are shown in Panel B.  Discount for the week prior to the 
actual open-ending is computed by using the latest observable NAV and market price.  Panel C presents 
the changes in Discounts, NAV and Price from post-announcement date to the pre open-ending date. 
 
 
Mean   Median  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Panel A: Behavior of discounts prior to open-ending announcement
Pre-announcement 12 month discount (%)  11.88 14.10  9.51  -19.29  33.03 
Pre-announcement 6 month discount (%)   12.14 12.37  9.64  -34.75  33.44 
Pre-announcement 1 month discount (%)  11.39 11.04  6.41  -6.17  30.56 
Pre-announcement average discount (%) 
for 12 months 
12.20 11.67  7.08  -9.11  29.75 
Pre-announcement standard deviation of 
discount for 12 months in % 
3.42 3.00  2.00  1.02  11.10 
          
Panel B: Discounts surrounding the announcement
Pre-announcement 1 week discount (%)  11.25 10.12  6.23  -1.27  31.51 
Post-announcement 1 week discount (%)  6.22 6.15  5.48  -21.69 34.72 
          
Panel C: Behavior of discount from announcement to date of open-ending 
Discount just prior to open-ending (%)  1.93 1.95  4.91  -35.8  10.32 
Change in Discount from post-
announcement to pre open-ending 
-4.29 -3.89  4.75  -33.07  6.12 
Percent change in NAV from post-
announcement to pre open-ending 
0.80 0.00 14.79 -38.72 55.34 
Percent change in Price from post-
announcement to pre open-ending 
5.63 3.09 16.94  -37.5  76.86 
  
Table 8: Decomposition of final discount prior to open-ending 
Summary statistics for close-ended funds that made open-ending announcement during the 1973 to 2005 
period is reported below. The sample size is limited to 88 funds whose distribution data is available. The 
first column shows the percentage difference between NAV and Price before open-ending by fund types 
and is computed as (NAV – Price)/NAV; the second column shows the percentage difference between 
distribution amount and Net Asset Value before open-ending by fund types and is computed as (NAV – 
Distribution amount)/ NAV; and the third column shows the percentage difference between Price and 
distribution amount before open-ending by fund types and is computed as (Distribution amount – 
Price)/NAV. Median values are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively.   
 
      
N  NAV – Price  NAV – Distribution  Distribution– Price 
            
Entire Sample  88 2.62%***  0.16%  2.46%*** 
    (2.34%)  (-0.03%)  (2.03%) 
         
Equity Funds  45 3.18%***  -0.92%  4.11%*** 
   (2.96%)  (-0.20%)  (3.14%) 
        
 Domestic  13 3.38%***  -1.54%  4.92%*** 
    (2.97%)  (1.49%)  (5.13%) 
 Foreign  32 3.11%***  -0.67%  3.78%*** 
    (2.61%)  (-0.10%)  (3.09%) 
         
Dual Funds  16 2.46%***  2.36%  0.11%*** 
   (2.34%)  (0.34%)  (0.80%) 
        
 Domestic  10 3.00%***  2.71%  0.30% 
    (2.70%)  (1.40%)  (0.83%) 
 Foreign  6 1.57%**  1.77%  -0.20% 
    (1.06%)  (0.27%)  (0.79%) 
         
Bond Funds  27 1.75%***  0.66%  1.09% 
       (0.93%)  (0.18%)  (1.73%) 
 
 Table 9: Cross-sectional analysis of post-announcement and open ending discounts 
 
Post announcement discount is the dependent variable in Panel A. Pre open-ending discount is the dependent variable in Panel B.  The 
regressors are similar to those employed in the earlier regression. Noise-to-signal ratio is computed the absolute value of the ratio of the 
idiosyncratic discount (ID) to the structural discount (SD) as computed in Table 6. Excluding outlier observations resulted in sample size smaller 
than the 113 cases in the two panels. ***, **, * denote significance levels of the t-statistics at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
 
  Panel A: Post-announcement discount   Panel B: Discount just prior to open-ending
     coeff t-stat   coeff t-stat coeff t-stat   coeff t-stat 
Noise-to-signal  ratio             _._ _._ -0.005 -0.52 _._ _._ 0.001 0.19
Turnover of Fund Shares in Market  0.008 2.18**            0.008 2.10** 0.004 1.90*  0.004 1.87*
Market Capitalization of Fund (log)  0.000 0.10          0.001 0.13  -0.001 -0.31 -0.001 -0.32
Equity Fund (Dummy)  0.039 3.60***   0.039 3.59***   0.014 1.79*    0.014 1.79* 
Foreign Fund (Dummy)  -0.008 -0.74    -0.007 -0.67    0.001 0.14    0.001 0.10 
Equity * Foreign  -0.028 -1.76*    -0.029 -1.85*    -0.006 -0.63    -0.006 -0.62 
NYSE (Dummy)  0.012 1.40    0.013 1.41        0.000 -0.04 0.000 -0.07
Illiquidity  (Dummy)             -0.003 -0.38 -0.003 -0.39 _._ _._ _._ _._
Time to Completion (log of days)  0.008 2.37**   0.008 2.42**   -0.007 -1.24    -0.007 -1.24 
Pre 1998 Period (Dummy)  -0.008 -1.22    -0.007 -1.09     0.013 2.89*** 0.012 2.59***
Constant -0.009 -0.18  -0.010        -0.19 0.021 0.58  0.021 0.57 
                          
F-statistic                  6.26*** 5.75*** 4.45*** 3.93***
R-squared                  33.1%  33.2%  22.2%  22.2%
Number                        106 106 109 109
 
 
 
  
 